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Abstract. Although firms use various strategies to try to influence government
policy, with lobbying and corruption chiefly among them, and political
institutions play an important role in determining policy choices, very little
research has been devoted to these topics. This paper tries to fill this gap. Using
cross-country enterprise-level data, it investigates (1) the effect of a key political
institution, namely electoral rules, on the probability that a firm engages in
lobbying activities and (2) the impact of lobbying on influence, accounting for
corruption and political institutions. The main conclusion is that lobbying is a
significantly more effective way of generating political influence than corruption,
and that electoral rules are a key mediating political institution. Our baseline
estimate is that the probability of influencing government policy is 16% higher for
firms that are members of lobbying groups than for those firms that are not.
1. Introduction
One of the main lessons from the burgeoning political economy literature
is that organized special interest groups (Bertrand et al., 2014) crucially
affect how economic policies are designed, agreed upon and implemented.
Moreover, the political economy literature stresses the importance of political
institutions in shaping the policy making process (Persson and Tabellini, 2002).
It seems therefore natural to enquire whether special interests can legitimately
organize themselves and, in so doing, whether they can overcome other more
individual, atomistic and direct methods, such as corruption, to exert influence on
government policies. It is important also to understand how this choice depends
upon political institutions.
While the economics literature on lobbying is vast, the relationship between
lobbying, corruption and political institutions, such as electoral rules, has not
been studied extensively. In this paper, we take the view that an important reason
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may be the lack of a clear-cut distinction between lobbying and corruption,
between the general phenomenon of special interests trying to gain influence
with parts of the public sector and some of its special manifestations.
There are of course ways other than lobbying and corruption to obtain
influence on government policies. Faccio (2006) shows for example how firms
can obtain political influence by having direct relationships with politicians.
The Grossman and Helpman (1994) model is probably the most influential
model of lobbying in economics and it conceptualizes lobbying as the provision
of resources to a policy maker. Thus, if one interprets these resources not as
campaign contributions but as bribes, one could argue that this is not a model of
lobbying but a model of corruption. Indeed, Coate and Morris (1999) or Yalcin
and Damania (2005) are but two examples of this interpretation.1
The vast majority of the empirical evidence is based on the US experience
where exactly what constitutes lobbying is commonly understood, in large part
because lobbying is highly regulated. The problem is that such evidence can
throw little light on the interaction between lobbying and political institutions,
simply because the latter do not vary sufficiently across US states nor over time.
This paper tries to address this imbalance by studying the relationship between
lobbying, corruption and political institutions, focusing on electoral rules across
26 Central and Eastern European countries.
We build upon the distinction proposed by Harstad and Svensson (2011)
where lobbying consists in seeking influence with policy makers while corruption
consists in seeking influence with policy enforcers or bureaucrats. Interestingly,
discretion is on the side of policy makers, and rules and their enforcement is on
the side of bureaucrats. Trying to influence ‘rule enforcers’ is often illegal, while
trying to influence ‘rule makers’ is not. Our data allow us to take this distinction
seriously in a cross-country context and to link them with a significant literature
that studies the relationship between political corruption and electoral rules. A
crucial difference between our analysis and the literature on political corruption
is that the latter uses country-level measures of corruption that tend to confuse
activities aimed at politicians, which we would define as lobbying, with those
aimed at bureaucrats which we define as corruption. This is not a semantic
difference but a very substantial one.
The main contribution of this paper is to put forward a framework and
attendant evidence in which the different roles of corruption and lobbying are
studied conditional on a set of political institutions. We focus on the various
ways in which elections are organized (‘electoral rules’) as our main political
institution of interest.
1 For surveys of the literature on lobbying, see among others Austen-Smith (1997), De Figueiredo and
Richter (2014), Drazen (2000), Grossman and Helpman (2001), Lowery and Gray (2004), Macher and
Mayo (2015), Mitchell and Munger (1991), Persson and Tabellini (2002), Potters and Sloof (1996), and
Van Winden (2004).
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Electoral rules have received considerable attention from economists (cf.
Persson et al. 2003 and references therein), which tends to focus on two of
its key features, namely the size or magnitude of the electoral districts and the
use of open lists of candidates. The magnitude of the electoral district refers to the
number of politicians elected in a typical electoral district. One can conjecture
that there are greater incentives for firms to be members of lobbying groups
when fewer officials are to be elected (or, in other words, the smaller the typical
electoral districts are). The open/closed-list feature of an electoral system reflects
the extent of the influence that general voters have vis-a`-vis party members and
officials. Closed lists give general voters less influence, and one can conjecture
that under certain conditions discussed in detail in section 2 below, give firms
more incentives to be members of lobbying groups.
Our main findings are as follows:
(1) Lobbying is significantly more likely, and corruption less likely, when the
electoral system features smaller electoral districts and open lists.
(2) The interaction between district magnitude and ballot structure is complex as
we find lobbying may become more prevalent as district magnitude increases
under closed lists.
(3) Lobbying is a more effective instrument for political influence than corruption.
Our baseline estimate is that the probability of influencing government policy
(the marginal effect at the mean) is 16% higher for firms that are members of
lobbying groups than for those firms that are not members of lobbying groups.
(4) The enterprise-level data set allows us to isolate the role of these political
institutions by controlling for firm-level features. We find, in line with previous
literature, that older, larger and foreign-owned firms in more democratic
countries are more likely to engage in lobbying activities.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we articulate the theoretical
underpinnings for our empirical analysis. In section 3, we describe the data and
econometric methodology, and discuss our measurement choices (with emphasis
on the lobbying membership variable, which is central to this analysis). Section 4
presents and discusses our econometric results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Theoretical underpinnings
The objective of this paper is to identify empirically the impact of different
electoral institutions on lobbying activity and to determine whether lobbying
activity is indeed effective in influencing government policy decisions. Our
contribution is to do this by defining lobbying as influence or activities that
are directed at rule makers as opposed to corruption, which is influence aimed
at rule enforcers. This is important because it implies a novel way of measuring
lobbying and corruption. In particular, our measures of lobbying and corruption
are not based on country-level surveys where respondents are asked for the
general level of corruption in a country and don’t distinguish between lobbying
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and corruption in the way we do, but on firm-level data where what constitutes
lobbying and what constitutes corruption are much more clearly identified.
The danger with country-level surveys is that if these measures fail to
distinguish between lobbying and corruption, and if these two phenomena are
substitutes (as suggested for instance by Campos and Giovannoni 2007), then
any identified relationship between these measures and political institutions is
potentially spurious. The confusion is one that is frequently underestimated in
the literature: Treisman (2007) surveys the empirical literature with regard to the
relationship between political institutions and corruption and points out that the
measures of corruption used (country-level perceptions of corruption indicators)
can include both what we define as lobbying and what we define as corruption.
For example, both Persson et al. (2003) and Chang and Golden (2007) study the
relationship between different characteristics of electoral rules and corruption in
a cross-country setting, but their survey-based measure of corruption captures
the two levels and is vulnerable to our critique.2 Chang and Golden are aware
of these limitations in the data and write:
Available cross-national measures of corruption do not allow us to distinguish
political corruption (that is, illegal activities on the part of elected public
officials) from other types of corruption, such as corruption by appointed
officials or bureaucrats and the increasingly public phenomenon of corporate
corruption. (p. 5, 2007)
They also provide an analysis based on Italy where the measure used does
capture illegal activity by politicians and addresses our critique, but this is not
available at cross-country level and is narrower than our definition of lobbying.
Another potential contribution of our analysis is that this is, to our knowledge,
the only study that attempts to link lobbying performance and political
institutions to the transition countries of Eastern Europe and former Soviet
Union, because they provide something as similar to a natural cross-country
experiment as we will ever encounter. All these countries started out in 1989
with similar levels of political and economic development. The variation in the
type and intensity of political influence in early 1989 across these countries is
minimal and the same can be said of their economic liberalization. Since 1989,
they have followed radically different economic and political trajectories, which
generate the variation we here also exploit to aid with identification.
Given that the objective of this paper is to undertake an empirical study
of the relationship between lobbying and electoral institutions, it is crucial to
understand what theory predicts are the relationships between these variables.
2 Holburn and Vanden Bergh (2004) are a rare exception in that they recognize that in the context of
the provision of campaign contributions, it is important to distinguish between those who seek influence
with the legislature directly and those who seek to (indirectly) influence regulatory agencies. This analysis
is limited to the US, however.
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A large literature on electoral rules has emphasized the role of elections as a
political mechanism for voters or principals to discipline politicians or agents.
According to this view, elections are a crucial element in democratic political
systems, not just because they help aggregate voters’ preferences but also because
they help solve both moral hazard and adverse selections issues that voters face
when dealing with politicians. In the context of lobbying, these issues are that
voters want to make sure both that candidates who are less amenable to influence
from lobbyists be elected (adverse selection) and that, once elected, politicians
have as few incentives to make deals with lobbyists as possible (moral hazard).
Moral hazard and adverse selection are conceptually separate issues and while
elections are supposed to be able to deal with them simultaneously, the literature
has focused on them separately and developed two distinct views of voting:
retrospective voting and prospective voting.
In retrospective-voting models, voters determine who to vote for by looking
at politicians’ past performance, so that for our purposes, this class of models in
particularly apt at capturing the aspect of elections as a mechanism for dealing
with the moral hazard problem in lobbying.
In prospective-voting models, on the other hand, voters vote for those
politicians who they believe will deliver better outcomes and so these models,
for our purposes, are useful for thinking of elections as a way of dealing with
the adverse selection problem in lobbying (Persson and Tabellini, 2002).
This conceptual distinction between prospective and retrospective views of
voting is extremely useful in interpreting the literature that links electoral
institutions with lobbying, because how some authors claim certain features
of an electoral system will affect the decisions of firms in that country to lobby is
more or less explicitly related to whether they emphasize the retrospective or the
prospective view of elections. Obviously, these two different interpretations of
what voting does in solving agency problems are complementary, not substitutes,
and yet the different emphasis leads different authors to theorize sometimes very
different consequences in terms of the incentive to lobby for specific electoral
rules.3
Persson et al. (2003) implicitly emphasize the retrospective-voting aspect of
elections, because their key question is whether a certain feature of an electoral
rule makes politicians more or less accountable for their actions. Thus, they argue
that decreasing district magnitude is associated with more lobbying because as
district magnitude decreases, fewer and fewer parties can hope to challenge.
3 The empirical papers discussed in this section claim to study the link between political corruption
and electoral institutions. As discussed above, it is our contention that a more appropriate distinction
is that between lobbying (of which political corruption is a part) and corruption (which is sometimes
described as petty corruption by these authors) and that even the distinction between political and petty
corruption is incorrectly captured by the data they use. All these differences notwithstanding, it is clear
that the theoretical predictions this literature makes about the relationship between electoral rules and
political corruption would still apply to lobbying as defined here.
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This gives voters less choice and makes it harder to hold politicians accountable.
They also argue that closed-party lists, where voters don’t have a direct choice
of candidates and can only vote for a given party, also reduce accountability
and make lobbying relatively more effective. The reason is that open-list systems
make it easier to punish a politician who is being influenced by lobbyists because
voters can still vote for the same party while punishing that specific politician,
something that is harder to do with closed lists.
Kunicova and Rose-Ackermann (2005) also focus on accountability and a
retrospective-voting interpretation of elections. Indeed, they agree with Persson
et al. (2003) on the reasons that should make closed-party lists inherently more
amenable to lobbying. They differ on district magnitude, however. Kunicova and
Rose-Ackermann (2005) argue that electoral systems where district magnitude
is small generate a smaller number of parties and so it is easier to see who
is accountable for specific policies, which should lead to fewer incentives for
lobbying.
Our view is that this difference in predictions for the relationship between
district magnitude and lobbying can be resolved by noting that, while it may
very well be that electoral systems leading to a smaller number of parties increase
visibility for the policy-making process, it is also true that if voters have few
alternatives, then it would be relatively difficult for them to punish politicians
who are influenced by lobbyists. Therefore, on balance we believe that in a
retrospective view of elections, we should expect lobbying to be associated with
closed lists and small district magnitudes.
Chang (2005) and Chang and Golden (2007) consider the consequences of
the ‘personal vote’ theory put forward by Shugart et al. (2005).4 This is an
inherently prospective-voting interpretation of elections because the emphasis
is not on whether a certain feature of an electoral system provides more or
less accountability but on whether that certain feature increases or decreases
competition among candidates and, consequently, whether there is a greater or
smaller need for a given candidate to acquire resources that helps him or her
compete. According to Chang (2005), in open-list systems, voters can express
a preference for specific candidates so that, from an individual candidate’s
perspective, competition is mostly with members of his or her own party, while in
a closed-list system, where the order of preference is fixed by the party, the focus
is on the competition across parties. The incentive to compete against candidates
of one’s own party thus makes candidates in open-list systems more eager to
please lobbyists in order to get the resources they need.
4 Chang (2005) does not measure corruption as a country-level survey variable, but directly collects
data on indictments for Italian politicians. This is much more likely to separate political corruption from
petty corruption and so, in our view, is more reliable. However, the paper focuses only on Italy (an
open-list system at the time) and doesn’t compare different electoral rules as such but looks at how much
competition different legislators face from other members of their own list.
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Chang and Golden (2007) refine this theory by linking the degree of openness
of party lists with district magnitude. The idea is that in an open-list system
the incentive to be receptive to lobbying is stronger as district magnitude
increases, because the number of candidates one has to compete against increases.
Conversely, in a closed-list system, the incentive to pander to lobbying interests
increases as the district magnitude decreases because as the number of candidates
decreases each candidate internalizes the direct effect he or she has on the
competition between parties. The conclusion is that we should expect open-
list systems to be vulnerable to lobbying and the more so as district magnitude
increases, while closed-list systems should less vulnerable to lobbying, although
this vulnerability should increase as district magnitude decreases.
We summarize our discussion with the following predictions:
1. (Retrospective view of elections)
a. There are greater incentives to lobby with closed-list systems
b. There are greater incentives to lobby when district magnitude is small.
2. (Prospective view of elections)
a. There are greater incentives to lobby in open-list systems.
b. In an open-list system, incentives to lobby increase in district magnitude, while
in a closed-list system incentives to lobby decrease in district magnitude.
Thus, theoretical predictions put forward by Persson et al (2003) on the one
hand and Chang (2005) and Chang and Golden (2007) on the other are, to some
extent, incompatible because of the different retrospective- versus prospective-
voting interpretations that they impose on what voting does. As mentioned,
from a theoretical perspective, both interpretations are valid and complement
each other, and it is therefore an empirical matter to decide which of the predicted
effects of specific electoral rules on the decision to lobby will prevail.
In our empirical analysis, we consider additional variables both at country
and firm levels. At the country level, we would expect that firms in countries
that are richer, less unequal and more democratic to rely more on lobbying and
less on corruption. At the firm level, we expect that foreign-owned firms would
tend to lobby more and to corrupt less than domestic firms. With respect to firm
size and age, two possible conjectures emerge. On the one hand, smaller and
younger, less established firms should be less likely to rely on lobbying because
they don’t have the resources or have not had the time to establish connections
with the political establishment. On the other hand, one can also conjecture
that it is precisely because of these drawbacks that these firms should be more
likely to join a lobby group that would compensate for this. Finally, we also
consider possible interactions between country-level and firm-level variables that
throw light on possible links, for example, small firms having greater influence
in more democratic countries or foreign firms having greater influence in smaller
countries.
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3. Data and methodology
In this section, we describe the main features of the data set and of the
econometric methodology we use to test the hypotheses outlined above. Our
main data source is the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey
(hereafter, BEEPS). This is a survey of firms that was conducted in 2005 by the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World
Bank. It covers more than 8,000 firms which were surveyed using identical
questionnaires through face-to-face interviews with firm managers and owners.5
The 26 East European countries in our sample are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland,
Serbia, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine andUzbekistan.
In order to ensure representativeness, statistical offices in each country were
contacted and the total numbers of firms by industry and of employees were
obtained.6 Information was also collected from the statistical offices on the
share of each industrial sector in gross domestic product (GDP) so that, for each
country, the composition of the firms in the sample reflects differences in the
relative shares of each sector in GDP as well as their firm size distribution.7
Central to our analysis is the question of whether the firm is a member of
a lobbying group. It is possible that firms lobby directly in addition to, or as
opposed to, lobbying indirectly through a trade association or lobby group.
Unfortunately, our data do not contain information on this. Further, the question
as phrased does not separate trade associations from pure lobby groups when
it is reasonable to expect that their effects may differ as the latter may tend to
be more focused. Contrast say an environmental lobby with a trade association
that lobbies for a broad range of issues that are of interest to its membership.
These issues notwithstanding, ‘membership’ is the standard way of proxying for
lobbying in the country-level literature that focuses on the US (Potters and Sloof,
1996).
Firms were asked whether or not they were a member of a trade association
at the time of the interview. A positive answer was coded 1, while the value of
zero was given to a negative answer. Approximately 37% of the firms in our
sample said they were members of a lobby group. Table A1 in the Appendix has
basic statistics, variable definitions and sources. The relatively large standard
deviation indicates that these figures vary across countries. Indeed, they range
5 The original questionnaire, a report on sampling and implementation and the data set are available
online at http://ebrd-beeps.com/
6 The sample is representative of firms operating in the formal sector and thus having a registration
number with the central authorities (in other words, it excludes those in the informal sector). The samples
were drawn for each country independently.
7 At least 10% of the sample was to be in the small and 10% in the large size categories. Firms with
only one employee or more than 10,000 employees were excluded.
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from a low of 19% of the firms being lobby members in Belarus to 91% of
Slovenian firms answering they were members at the time of the interview.8 If
we correlate lobbying membership with the level of per capita GDP (the source
for the latter is the Penn World Tables and the data refer to the log of per
capita GDP at purchasing power parity) we can see there is a positive correlation
between lobby membership and per capita GDP, but also that this correlation
is not particularly high, at around 0.12. Table A2 in the Appendix presents the
correlation matrix. It is also worthwhile mentioning that the highest pairwise
correlations involve per capita GDP: the highest one is 0.79, between per capita
GDP and a measure of democracy.
Note that, using the BEEPS 1999 and 2002 data to compare levels of lobby
membership in 2005 to those in 1999 and 2002, one finds it is rising in these
economies. Moreover, this is happening while these countries post positive and
high GDP growth rates and, as noted by the EBRD (2006), decreasing levels of
corruption.
The central hypothesis is that political institutions in general, and electoral
rules in particular, are a crucial determinant of a decision to lobby. Following
on from the previous section, we collected data on the key relevant political
institutions from the World Bank Database of Political Institutions (DPI: Keefer
2005). In particular, the variable ‘closed lists’ reflect whether or not closed lists
are used in the electoral system, while ‘mean district magnitude’ reflects the size
of electoral districts. Keefer (2005) defines mean district magnitude as:
the weighted average of the number of representatives elected by each
constituency size, if available. If not, we use the number of seats divided by
the number of constituencies, if both are known. If the constituencies are
the provincial or state divisions, we use the number of states or provinces to
make this calculation for as long as we know this number and the number of
seats. If the only information we have on the number of constituencies comes
from the Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU), and the constituencies are not the
states/provinces, then we use IPU’s number to calculate the Mean District
Magnitude for 1995, and leave all unknowns blank.
How lobbying translates into political influence and how it consequently
affects firm performance are important issues. The measure of influence we use
reflects firms’ perceptions of whether it has influenced the content of laws and
regulations affecting their operation. The source is again the 2005 BEEPS data
base. Our measure is a binary variable coded 1 if the firm answered ‘yes’, and
zero if it answered ‘no’. We find that 14% of the firms answer yes to this question
on influence, with the relatively large standard deviation suggesting large cross-
country variation: from 3% in Uzbekistan to 33% in Slovenia. The pairwise
8 For the sake of robustness and because Slovenian firms were obliged to be members of a trade
association until the late 1990s, we re-estimated all models reported below without these firms and find
that our main results were unaffected (these are available from the authors upon request).
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correlations between corruption and lobbying, on the one hand, and influence,
on the other, are also not high, being around -0.001 for the former and about
0.27 for the latter.
From the BEEPS 20005 data set, we also obtain various auxiliary variables
to reflect potentially important characteristics of the firms. These are the year
in which the firm started production, the size of the firm (number of full-time
employees) and whether or not the largest shareholder is a foreign company.
The year in which the average firm started operating is 1989. This is because of
a few old firms in the sample, the oldest dating from 1825. As explained above,
the majority of the firms sampled are small privately owned enterprises, so it is
unsurprising to see that the share of medium-sized firms, classified in the original
questionnaire as having more than 50 and less than 249 full-time employees, is
around 19% of the total and that of large firms, with more than 250 full-time
employees, is about 9%. By the same token, the share of foreign-owned firms
is approximately 12%. We have also added an important country-level control
that many believe mediates the relationship between political institutions
(electoral rules), on the one hand, and lobbying membership and perceived
policy influence on the other. That factor is income inequality and here it is
measured by the Gini coefficient obtained from the UNU-WIDERWorld Income
Inequality Database (WIID).
The measure of corruption that we favour captures firms’ experience in each
country. Our firm-level corruption measure is originally from the BEEPS data
base. In our analysis, it is the answer to the following question: ‘On average,
what percent[age] of total annual sales do firm’s [sic] like yours typically pay
in unofficial payments/gifts to public officials?’ A crucial indication that we are
indeed capturing something inherently different with our measures of corruption
and lobbying is that the simple correlation between these two is very low, at -
0.038. Also of interest is that the correlation between corruption and the level
of per capita GDP is negative but not particularly high, at -0.13.
Let us now turn to the econometric methodology. There are two main
questions of interest: (a) what are the factors that determine the likelihood
of a firm being a member of a lobby group? (b) What is the role of lobby
membership in explaining the probability of a firm seeing itself as influential
vis-a`-vis government laws and regulations? As explained above, the dependent
variables in (a) and (b) are dichotomous variables. In question (a), it takes the
value of 1 if the firm is a lobby member and of zero if not. In question (b) it takes
the value of 1 if the firm perceives itself as influential, zero otherwise.
The focus is on which political institutions affect lobbying and how they do
so. Thus we estimate the following maximum likelihood probit equation for
lobbying:
P (Lobbyic = 1) = (β0FSic + β1Ageic + β2Ownerprivic
+β3Ownerforic + β4GDPc + δPic + πVic) (1)
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where Lobbyic is a binary variable indicating whether firm i in country c is a
member of a lobbying group; FSic is firm size (measured in numbers of full-time
employees); Ageic is the year the firm started to operate; Ownerprivic is whether
the firm has private owners; Ownerforic is whether the firm has foreign owners;
GDPc is real per capita GDP in the country in which the firm is located; Pic is
a vector of political institutions variables (as discussed above, electoral rules);
Vic is a vector of auxiliary control variables; and  is the cumulative standard
normal distribution function. In order to minimize omitted variables concerns,
we include sector fixed-effects in all regressions we estimate, with the sector
dummies representing a coarse way of dealing with the important issue of asset
specificity. Country fixed-effects cannot be included because of their correlation
with the political institutions variable we use but standard errors are clustered
at the country level, and country-level variables such as the level of per capita
income and the Gini coefficient for income inequality are included throughout.
The next model we estimate is for political influence and uses the following
probit equation:
P (Influenceic = 1) = (δ1Lobbyic + ηWic) (2)
where Influence ic is a binary variable indicating whether firm i (in country c)
perceives itself as influential vis-a`-vis laws and regulations; lobbyic is the binary
variable defined above; Wic is a vector of auxiliary control variables (including
per capita GDP, firm size and ownership); and  is the cumulative standard
normal distribution function. In order to minimize omitted variables concerns,
we include sector fixed-effects in all regressions we estimated and cluster the
standard errors at the country level.
In these latter models on influence, one concern is the potential endogeneity
of lobby membership. This refers to the possibility that firms may be more likely
to join lobby groups if and when such groups are perceived to be influential. It is
therefore important to address this possibility. We do so using an instrumental
variables approach by estimating the influence equation (equation 2 above),
while treating lobbying as an endogenous variable.
We carry out two different exercises. In the first, we use different instruments
to assess the potential endogeneity of lobbying or, in other words, whether
the exogenous or unexplained part of the variation we observe in the lobbying
decision is a good predictor of policy influence. We use a set of instruments to
capture the strength of civil society: a dynamicmeasure of ethnic fractionalization
(Campos and Kuzeyev, 2007), a measure of natural resources abundance (World
Bank, 2005) and the average number of political protests events in 1989 (from
Bruszt et al., 2012). We expect that increases in fractionalization and natural
resource abundance reduce the likelihood of firms joining lobbying groups
and increase the probability of firms using corruption as a preferred means
of influencing government policy. By the same token, we expect the number of
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137417000108
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Bristol Library, on 13 Apr 2017 at 15:26:18, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
12 NAURO F. CAMPOS AND FRANCESCO GIOVANNONI
Table 1. The effects of electoral rules on lobbying: probit estimates for a sample of firms in
26 countries, 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age of the firm 0.00481∗∗∗ 0.00446∗∗∗ 0.00447∗∗∗ 0.00447∗∗∗
[0.00102] [0.000997] [0.00103] [0.00103]
Medium-sized firm 0.522∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗
[0.0397] [0.0390] [0.0404] [0.0404]
Large firm 0.780∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗ 0.789∗∗∗ 0.789∗∗∗
[0.0565] [0.0554] [0.0577] [0.0577]
Foreign-owned firm 0.351∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗
[0.0478] [0.0469] [0.0489] [0.0489]
Log per capita GDP 0.00818 0.326∗∗ −0.00153 −0.00153
[0.0770] [0.142] [0.0760] [0.0760]
Income inequality (Gini) 0.0441∗ 0.0110 0.0456∗ 0.0456∗
[0.0261] [0.0194] [0.0261] [0.0261]
Closed list −1.118∗∗∗ −1.539∗∗∗
[0.156] [0.197]
Mean district magnitude −0.0093∗∗∗ −0.0405∗∗∗
[0.00220] [0.0179]
Interaction CL x mean district 0.000289∗∗ 0.0408∗∗
[0.000119] [0.0179]
Constant −2.285 −3.655∗∗ −3.397∗∗ −1.858
[1.617] [1.752] [1.704] [1.742]
Observations 8,539 8,764 8,214 8,214
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at country level. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10.
Dependent variable is a dummy for Lobby Membership, with yes equal to 1, zero otherwise. Sectoral
fixed-effects are included in all specifications.
political protests before 1989 to increase the likelihood that firms will lobby and
decrease the probability that they will choose corruption.
The second way we implement instrumental variables in this context is to
use our various electoral rules features as instruments for lobbying. This is a
particularly interesting exercise because it allows us to further investigate whether
the effect of political institutions (electoral rules) on the capacity to influence
government policy is mostly direct or mostly indirect, that is, on their own
account or through membership in business or trade associations.
4. Econometric results and discussion
In this section, we present and discuss our econometric results. First, we
investigate whether electoral institutions do indeed affect lobbying in light of the
hypotheses discussed above. Second, we study how lobbying generates political
influence and which type of role (direct or indirect) political institutions play.
What are the main factors that determine whether a firm is a member of a
lobbying group? Which electoral institutions affect lobbying, and how do they
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Table 2. The effects of electoral rules on lobbying: probit estimates for a sample of firms in
26 countries, 2005. Interaction between small firms and democracy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age of the firm 0.00471∗∗∗ 0.00433∗∗∗ 0.00436∗∗∗ 0.00436∗∗∗
[0.00104] [0.00101] [0.00104] [0.00104]
Medium-sized firm 0.0819 0.0228 0.0250 0.0250
[0.0954] [0.101] [0.103] [0.103]
Large firm 0.356∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗
[0.102] [0.107] [0.110] [0.110]
Foreign-owned firm 0.345∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗
[0.0481] [0.0471] [0.0492] [0.0492]
Log per capita GDP 0.0152 0.347∗∗ 0.0108 0.0108
[0.0753] [0.138] [0.0741] [0.0741]
Income inequality (Gini) 0.0404 0.00558 0.0410 0.0410
[0.0255] [0.0189] [0.0215] [0.0215]
Interaction small firms and −0.102∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗
democracy [0.0202] [0.0214] [0.0215] [0.0215]
Closed list −1.304∗∗∗ −1.754∗∗∗
[0.158] [0.202]
Mean district magnitude −0.00966∗∗∗ −0.0437∗∗
[0.00215] [0.0178]
Interaction CL x mean district 0.000160 0.0439∗∗∗
[0.000118] [0.0178]
Constant −1.643 −3.149∗ −2.881∗ −1.127
[1.587] [1.711] [1.663] [1.704]
Observations 8,539 8,764 8,214 8,214
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at country level. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10.
Dependent variable is a dummy for Lobby Membership, with yes equal to 1, zero otherwise. Sectoral
fixed-effects are included in all specifications.
do it? Tables 1–3 report our results. Our results first suggest that firms are less
likely to resort to lobbying when district magnitude is larger, a result that is
compatible with the retrospective-voting view of elections. On the other hand,
our results suggest that firms are also less likely to lobby when based in countries
where the electoral system has closed lists and this result is not compatible with
a retrospective-voting view of elections, but it is compatible with the prospective
view put forward by Chang (2005) and Chang and Golden (2007). Moreover,
considering the interaction between district magnitude and closed lists, we obtain
the result predicted by the retrospective view of elections. This is because among
closed-list electoral systems, our results suggest it is those with the larger district
magnitude that seem to make firms more likely to lobby. On balance, these
results suggest to us that only certain aspects of each interpretation of elections
can be confirmed, although the retrospective view seems to enjoy slightly stronger
support.
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Table 3. The effects of electoral rules on lobbying: probit estimates for a sample of firms in
26 countries, 2005. Interaction between foreign ownership and per capita GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age of the firm 0.00484∗∗∗ 0.00448∗∗∗ 0.00450∗∗∗ 0.00450∗∗∗
[0.00102] [0.000997] [0.00103] [0.00103]
Medium-sized firm 0.523∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗
[0.0397] [0.0390] [0.0404] [0.0404]
Large firm 0.781∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗ 0.790∗∗∗ 0.790∗∗∗
[0.0565] [0.0554] [0.0577] [0.0577]
Foreign-owned firm 0.892∗∗ 0.781∗∗ 0.899∗∗ 0.899∗∗
[0.387] [0.359] [0.386] [0.386]
Log per capita GDP 0.0151 0.330∗∗ 0.00554 0.00554
[0.0774] [0.142] [0.0764] [0.0764]
Income inequality (Gini) 0.0430 0.0104 0.0445∗ 0.0445∗
[0.0262] [0.0194] [0.0262] [0.0262]
Interact foreign-owned and −0.0666 −0.0539 −0.0680 −0.0680
log per capita GDP [0.0471] [0.0441] [0.0470] [0.0470]
Closed list −1.116∗∗∗ −1.544∗∗∗
[0.156] [0.197]
Mean district magnitude −0.00923∗∗∗ −0.0413∗∗∗
[0.00221] [0.0180]
Interaction CL x mean district 0.000287∗∗ 0.0416∗∗∗
[0.000120] [0.0180]
Constant −2.296 −3.661∗∗ −3.405∗ −1.861
[1.624] [1.757] [1.712] [1.750]
Observations 8,539 8,764 8,214 8,214
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at country level. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10.
Dependent variable is a dummy for Lobby Membership, with yes equal to 1, zero otherwise. Sectoral
fixed-effects are included in all specifications.
One conclusion that can be reached with confidence is that these differences
between our results and those in some of the previous literature reaffirm the
notion that measuring political corruption with country-level survey variables
can provide misleading results and that the study of the relationship between
lobbying and corruption requires a clearer distinction between the influencing
of rule makers versus rule enforcers. These results also prevent us from drawing
a definite conclusion on what role either retrospective or prospective voting in
elections play in firms’ decision to lobby. One simple explanation is that since the
claims of the proponents of retrospective and prospective voting offer different
predictions, ambiguous results simply reflect the fact that voters embark on both
retrospective and prospective considerations at the same time, and which of the
two dominates may not be strongly dependent on key features of the electoral
system.
In Tables 2 and 3 we also check for interactions between country-level and
firm-level variables and find evidence that the more democratic a regime is,
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the more likely it is that small firms will lobby. This is a reassuring result,
because among other things it is compatible with the notion that our measure
of lobbying captures attempts to influence rule makers through legal means and
does not necessarily coincide with political corruption.9 There is considerably
less evidence that foreign firms are either more or less likely to lobby depending
on a country’s level of per capita GDP (Table 3).10 It is also important to note
that accounting for such rich interactions does not substantially change our main
conclusions about political institutions and lobbying: firms that are more likely
to engage in lobbying are those where the electoral system favours open (not
closed) lists and smaller electoral districts.
There are also various interesting findings referring to the controls we use: for
example, we find evidence that older, larger and foreign firms are systematically
more likely than younger, smaller and domestic firms to bemembers of a lobbying
group. These findings are very much in line with the rest of the literature (Kerr
et al. 2014). Interestingly, the level of per capita GDP itself also doesn’t
seem to have an ambiguous effect on incentives to lobby: this again may be
because lobbying, as defined here, includes the use of information, campaign
contributions and endorsements.11 This suggests that future work should be
focused on building data that further distinguish between these different lobbying
choices.
One natural question that follows is how effective lobbying is. Table 4
examines its importance in terms of the production of political influence. The
main finding is that firms in our sample systematically point to lobbying as
a very effective way of exerting political influence. As shown in Table 4, the
coefficient on corruption is never significant and, in a few cases, even suggests
that corrupt firms are less influential, lending some further support to the notion
of substitutability between the two. In terms of firm characteristics, the results
are also reassuring: we find that older and larger firms tend to see themselves as
more influential, while foreigners and those located in richer countries do not
necessarily see themselves as more influential.12
For two hypothetical firms with same average characteristics, the predicted
probability of influencing government policy (the marginal effect at the mean)
9 It is important to point out that when one replicates the regressions in Tables 1–3, substituting our
measure of corruption for our measure of lobbying, we get the result that any electoral institution that
increases the incentive to lobby in Tables 1–3 decreases the incentive to use corruption.
10 We also find the effects of an interaction term between firm age and political democracy to be
similar to those for firm size (arguably because of the correlation between size and age).
11 However, it is important to note that the main conclusions from Tables 1–3 do not change when
measures of corruption are added to the specifications (either firm-based or country-level). We find the
coefficients on these measures are seldom statistically different from zero.
12 When we considered the impact of lobbying and corruption on firm performance, measured as
sales growth, we found evidence that firms that lobby tend to experience faster growth in their sales than
firms that use corruption (available upon request).
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Table 4. The effects of lobbying on political influence: probit estimates for a sample of firms
in 26 countries, 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age of the firm 0.00594∗∗∗ 0.00627∗∗∗ 0.00560∗∗∗ 0.00570∗∗∗
[0.000913] [0.000994] [0.000923] [0.000927]
Medium-sized firm 0.278∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗
[0.0358] [0.0376] [0.0336] [0.0358]
Large firm 0.431∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗
[0.0632] [0.0587] [0.0642] [0.0641]
Foreign-owned firm 0.233∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗
[0.0812] [0.0739] [0.0805] [0.0832]
Lobbying 0.817∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗ 0.806∗∗∗ 0.801∗∗∗
[0.0751] [0.0771] [0.0781] [0.0807]
Corruption 0.0544 0.0164 0.0164 0.0434
[0.0453] [0.0434] [0.0426] [0.0330]
Per capita GDP −0.095 −0.159∗∗ −0.155∗∗ −0.185∗∗∗
[0.137] [0.0632] [0.0687] [0.0673]
Income inequality (Gini) −0.0109∗ −0.0117∗ −0.0104∗ −0.0114∗
[0.00654] [0.00617] [0.00600] [0.00683]
Closed list −0.200∗ −0.246∗
[0.114] [0.148]
Mean district magnitude −0.00103∗∗∗ −0.00248
[0.000199] [0.00917]
Interaction CL x mean district −0.000998∗∗∗ 0.00148
[0.000212] [0.00918]
Constant −0.355 0.318 0.205 0.566
[1.491] [0.839] [0.861] [0.841]
Observations 8,135 8,362 7,812 7,812
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at country level. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10.
Dependent variable is a dummy for individual firm’s influence on government policy, yes equal to 1, zero
otherwise. Sectoral fixed-effects are included in all specifications.
is 16% higher for firms that lobby than for those that do not. This effect is
remarkably constant across specifications. Even though the coefficient capturing
the impact of corruption is never statistically significantly different from zero, the
predicted effect of lobbying is always larger than the estimated marginal effect
for corruption.
Thanks to the large number of firms in the BEEPS survey we can also carry out
an important robustness check in terms of whether these findings differ across
sectors. One can conjecture that manufacturing firms would be more likely to
choose lobbying over corruption than, for example, firms in the construction
sector. In order to assess this possibility, we re-estimate the model in Table 4 for
as many sectors as the database allows us to differentiate. Our overall finding
is that our main conclusions do not change, that is, for most sectors lobbying
membership is a much-preferred method of obtaining political influence, much
more so than corruption. Yet there are two noticeable exceptions: wholesale and
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real estate. For firms in mining, construction, manufacturing, transport, hotels
and ‘others’, lobbying is always more important than corruption in generating
political influence (the coefficient on lobbying is always statistically significant
while the one on corruption never is). Lobbying is also very effective in producing
influence for firms in the wholesale and real estate sectors, but now the coefficient
on corruption is significant and positive for wholesale and negative for real estate.
This is an exciting result because it suggests the possibility that firms use mixed
strategies depending on their main area of economic activity.13
One major concern regarding the results above is reverse causality: that is,
that lobbying and political influence may be jointly determined. It may be the
case that lobbying in the influence equation is endogenous because, say, firms
are more likely to join lobby groups when they perceive them to be effective
(i.e. influential). To try to deal with this concern, we re-estimate the influence
equation (equation 2) treating lobbying as an endogenous variable and we do so
in two different ways as discussed below.
In the first exercise, we use three instruments (Table 5, columns 1 to 3) to check
whether the exogenous or unexplained part of the variation we observe in the
lobbying decision is a good predictor of policy influence. Our three instruments
are ethnic fractionalization in 1989, natural resources abundance and the average
number of political protests in 1989. Examining the first-stage regressions we
find that natural resource abundance in a country and ethnic fractionalization
significantly decrease lobbying (interestingly, these have opposite effects on
corruption). The choice of these instruments is also justified in purely statistical
terms, specifically from standard Wald exogeneity tests. The main conclusion is
that there is little evidence that reverse causality affects our baseline results in
important ways.
In the second exercise, we use the various measures of political institutions
(electoral rules) as instruments for lobbying (columns 4 to 7 in Table 5). This
allows us to investigate whether the effect of electoral rules on influence is direct
or indirect (through lobbying) as well as whether the exogenous or unexplained
part of the variation we observe in the lobbying decision is a good predictor of
policy influence.
We can conclude from columns 4 to 7 that electoral rules seem to exert a much
more powerful indirect (through lobbying) effect on political influence compared
to its direct effect on political influence. Another way of testing this possibility
(available from the authors) is to examine the interaction between lobbying and
the political institutions. We find these interactions to be significant while the
13 One can imagine that lobbying is an ‘offensive strategy’ in that it can wield political influence,
which decreases competition and benefits the individual firm. However, a firm may only pay bribes
because it is forced to do so. Thus, there isn’t a direct benefit to the firm and one should not expect this
to generate political influence. This could be a ‘defensive strategy’, necessary to operate in a politically
corrupt environment.
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Table 5. The effects of lobbying on political influence: instrumental variables probit estimates for a sample of firms in 26 countries, 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Age of the firm 0.00301∗∗ 0.00619∗∗∗ 0.00235 0.00257 0.00332∗ 0.00173 0.00123
[0.00149] [0.00135] [0.00155] [0.00177] [0.00181] [0.00198] [0.00208]
Medium-sized firm 0.059 0.271∗∗∗ 0.00235 0.0206 − 0.00491 − 0.0561 − 0.0953
[0.0729] [0.0689] [0.0753] [0.0985] [0.105] [0.115] [0.122]
Large firm 0.0619 0.379∗∗∗ − 0.0156 0.00939 0.00353 − 0.0816 − 0.134
[0.106] [0.0968] [0.110] [0.141] [0.151] [0.165] [0.174]
Foreign-owned firm 0.00979 0.127∗ − 0.0252 − 0.0138 0.00219 − 0.0555 − 0.0793
[0.0715] [0.0685] [0.0734] [0.0863] [0.0894] [0.0975] [0.0998]
Lobbying 2.088∗∗∗ 0.888∗∗∗ 2.404∗∗∗ 2.292∗∗∗ 2.328∗∗∗ 2.717∗∗∗ 2.938∗∗∗
[0.282] [0.274] [0.279] [0.465] [0.494] [0.542] [0.573]
Corruption 0.0243 0.111 0.0286 0.0274 0.0368 0.0342 0.0414
[0.0918] [0.0857] [0.0946] [0.0936] [0.0961] [0.103] [0.105]
Per capita GDP −0.131∗∗∗ − 0.110∗∗∗ − 0.129∗∗∗ − 0.130∗∗∗ − 0.171∗∗∗ − 0.165∗∗∗ − 0.0817∗
[0.0330] [0.0353] [0.0340] [0.0338] [0.0370] [0.0430] [0.0480]
Income inequality −0.00176 − 0.0125∗∗∗ 0.000308 − 0.00112 0.000354 0.00528 0.0174∗
(Gini) [0.00493] [0.00454] [0.00507] [0.00561] [0.00680] [0.00721] [0.00994]
Closed list −0.00371 − 0.170∗∗∗ − 0.0159 − 0.00381 0.343∗∗
[0.0668] [0.0659] [0.0673] [0.0716] [0.174]
Mean district magnitude − 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0213∗∗∗
[0.000193] [0.00786]
Interaction CL x MDM − 0.001∗∗∗ − 0.022∗∗∗
[0.000205] [0.00788]
Constant −0.961∗∗ − 0.363 − 1.141∗∗∗ − 1.052∗∗ − 0.753∗ − 1.103∗∗ − 2.665∗∗∗
[0.390] [0.446] [0.399] [0.441] [0.410] [0.473] [0.899]
Observations 7,714 7,283 7,714 7,714 7,956 7,453 7,453
Instruments Political
protest
events
1989
Ethnic
Fraction-
alization
in 1989
Natural
resources
Closed lists Mean
district
Interaction
CL and
MDM
Interaction
CL and
MDM
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at country level. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10. Dependent variable is a dummy for individual firm’s
influence on government policy, yes equal to 1, zero otherwise. Sectoral fixed-effects are included in all specifications.
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results for lobbying and for corruption remain unchanged, further supporting
the idea that the effects of political institutions on influence are mostly indirect,
through the firm’s choice of membership in lobbying groups.
Both exercises produced strong results that reinforce the finding that lobbying
is a more effective way of generating influence on government policies than
corruption and that the effect of electoral rules on influence occurs mostly
through lobbying, rather than independently or directly.
5. Conclusions
This paper studies how a firm chooses to influence government policies. We
differentiate between corruption and lobbying as twomainmethods of producing
influence. In doing so we challenge a commonly held view that these differ mostly
in the means used to obtain influence, while we argue that the fundamental
difference has to do with where influence is being sought. For us, lobbying
includes all the actions taken to obtain influence with rule makers while
corruption includes all the actions taken to influence rule enforcers. We note
that across the globe the latter is seldom legal, while the former is often legal.
We provide a conceptual framework in which we show how this distinction
allows us a set of predictions on the relationship between these phenomena and
how they are affected by different political institutional set-ups.
Using 2005 survey data for a large number of firms across 26 countries, we
show that political institutions play a significant role in explaining the decision
to lobby. More specifically, we focus on electoral systems and find that the
firms that are more likely to engage in lobbying are those where the electoral
system has open lists and smaller districts and that they tend to be older, larger
and foreign-owned. Crucially, we find confirmation that lobbying seems to be a
much more effective instrument for political influence than corruption and this
even in poorer, less developed countries than those normally considered in the
literature. Our baseline estimate is that the probability of influencing government
policy is 16% higher for firms that are members of lobbying groups compared
to those firms that are not with political institutions playing an important role,
which is chiefly indirect and magnifies the effect of lobbying. The implications
of these results for individual firms are straightforward in supporting lobbying
instead of corruption as the preferred method to effectively influence government
policy.We also note we obtained evidence that lobbying is a stronger predictor of
firms’ sales growth than corruption, which further supports the broad direction
of such policy implications.
One main challenge for future research on these issues is that while more
precise data at firm level on corruption is beginning to be available, data on
lobbying at the firm level are still very sketchy. We believe that a very important
issue is, for example, that using existing data one cannot distinguish firms
that lobby indirectly (through a trade association or lobby group) from firms
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that lobby directly; and nor can one separate trade associations from pure
lobby groups. Further, we have stressed above the importance of differentiating
between lobbying and corruption with respect to their targets rather than the
means used. Once this distinction is better appreciated, the question of how
different ways of lobbying perform in specific institutional contexts will gain
urgency. On this count, further progress at both theoretical and empirical level
is still needed and would be extremely valuable.
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Appendix
Table A1. Basic statistics, variable definitions and data sources
Variable Mean Std Dev. N Definition and Source
Lobby membership 0.3714 0.4832 9,098 Dummy variable: 1 if firm is a member of
a trade association or lobby group,
0 otherwise. Source: BEEPS (2005)
Corruption 1.033 2.467 8,230 Answer to ‘on average, what percentage
of total annual sales do firms like yours
typically pay in unofficial
payments/gifts to public officials?’
Source: BEEPS (2005)
Influence 0.1404 0.3474 9,093 Dummy variable: 1 if firm answers ‘yes’
to whether it has influenced the content
of laws and regulations affecting its
operation, 0 otherwise. Source: BEEPS
(2005)
Age of the firm 15.54 17.46 9,090 Year in which firm started production.
Source: BEEPS (2005)
Foreign ownership 0.118 0.323 9,098 Dummy variable: 1 if any foreign firm has
a financial stake in respondent firm,
0 otherwise. Source: BEEPS (2005)
Small firm 0.706 0.456 9,097 Dummy variable: 1 if firm has between 2
and 49 full time employees,
0 otherwise. Source: BEEPS (2005)
Medium-sized firm 0.198 0.398 9,097 Dummy variable: 1 if firm has between
50 and 199 full time employees,
0 otherwise. Source: BEEPS (2005)
Large firm 0.096 0.295 9,097 Dummy variable: 1 if firm has between
200 and above full time employees,
0 otherwise. Source: BEEPS (2005)
Closed lists 0.789 0.407 8,548 Dummy variable: 1 if the electoral system
uses closed lists. Source: Keefer (2005)
Mean district magnitude 62.93 16.2 9,098 The weighted average of the number of
representatives elected by each
constituency size, if available.
Source: Keefer (2005)
Log GDP 8.151 0.973 9,098 Log of per capita gross domestic product
(PPP).
Gini coefficient 37.84 0.295 9,098 Gini coefficient for income inequality
circa 2003. Source: UNU-WIDER
World Income Inequality Database
(WIID)
Democracy 4.255 1.63 9,098 Composite measure of democracy.
Source: Freedom House’s Nations in
Transit (2008)
Source: Penn World Tables.
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Table A2. Correlation matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 Lobby member
2 Corruption −0.038
3 Influence 0.278 −0.001
4 Firm age 0.161 −0.073 0.155
5 Medium size 0.143 −0.025 0.108 0.148
6 Large size 0.164 −0.055 0.141 0.331 −0.159
7 Foreign 0.112 −0.013 0.084 −0.031 0.119 0.132
8 Log GDP pc 0.121 −0.136 0.008 0.049 −0.021 −0.003 −0.039
9 Gini −0.161 0.145 −0.060 −0.053 0.003 −0.002 0.027 −0.681
10 Closed list −0.107 0.103 −0.042 −0.017 0.006 0.009 −0.019 −0.465 0.414
11 District size −0.044 −0.001 −0.062 −0.011 −0.017 0.008 0.022 −0.406 0.299 0.144
12 Democracy 0.131 −0.135 0.027 0.082 −0.011 −0.018 −0.023 0.799 −0.494 −0.469 −0.394
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